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When you come to a fork in the road, take it.

-Yogi

Berra (attributed)

INTRODUCTION

In general, persons complaining that a statute is unconstitutional are
required to show that it is unconstitutional as applied to them; possible
unconstitutionality as to others is deemed irrelevant.' This will be
referred to as the as-applied mode of constitutional adjudication. An
exception has developed when claims of overbreadth are made with

regard to statutes impairing freedom of expression.2 This exception,
which will be referred to as the First Amendment Overbreadth ("FAO")
Doctrine, permits attack on such a statute by persons who have no
ground for constitutional complaint in their own right upon a showing
that the statute invades the constitutionally protected conduct of others

If such overbreadth is found and is substantial, the statute can no longer
be enforced as written.' If not amended, it must be stripped of its
unconstitutional features by judicial construction before prosecutions
under it can be sustained. The purpose, according to the Supreme Court,

1. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
255 (1953).
2. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)
(applying the overbreadth doctrine to invalidate a resolution banning all "First Amendment activities"
at Los Angeles International Airport); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972) (holding that
Georgia's "fighting words" statute was unconstitutionally overbroad); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (dealing with a statute aimed at subversive activity).
3. FAO cases typically involve criminal prosecutions or anticipatory actions to fend off such
prosecutions, but they can also arise in a civil context. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973) (involving restrictions on state employees). In discussing FAO cases, the criminal context
is usually assumed to avoid more cumbersome locutions.
Similarly, this Article makes references to statutes that are constitutional as to the claimant
and unconstitutional as to others. But the same problem arises when some applications of the statute
to the claimant are constitutional while other applications to the same person are unconstitutional.
Again, to avoid more cumbersome locutions, the first-person/third-person terminology is employed
throughout.
4. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,769 (1982); Broadrick,413 U.S. at 615. Compare
the plurality opinion of Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg in Morse v. Republican
Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996), which considered the First Amendment validity of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, but only with respect to how it may abridge associational rights. See id. at 1210 n.38.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas commented, in their dissent, that the other Justices'
refusal to consider the overbreadth implications of the case was "astounding." Id. at 1216-17.
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is to curb the chilling effect of statutory overbreadth on protected
speech.5
The FAO Doctrine is applicable in every court in the land, starting
at the trial level. It has been the subject of an enormous amount of
litigation.6 Yet, despite the fact that over thirty years have passed since
its first modem formulation in Dombrowski v. Pfister,7 the FAQ
Doctrine remains shrouded in mystery.
Thus, the Court keeps repeating that the FAO Doctrine is "strong
medicine" to be imposed "sparingly and only as a last resort."8 But the
FAQ Doctrine is not imposed only as a last resort. Indeed, the contrary
is the case, for reasons inherent in the Doctrine itself. Further, FAQ
"medicine" is relatively mild. It does little to curb chilling-not that an
effective "medicine" designed to that end would have to be "strong."
The tenuous nature of the Court's hold on the FAO Doctrine can be
gauged from the fact that the Court has made contradictory statements
about the remedial consequences of overbreadth, in apparent unawareness
of any inconsistency. Indeed, not long ago, while purporting to state
existing law and without protest by any of the Justices, the Court
rationalized the FAO Doctrine in a way that essentially repudiated its
basic premise--as the Author will attempt to show.
Part I of this Article deals with the remedial implications of an
adjudication of FAO overbreadth, discusses the problem of invalidation
generally, and culminates in an inquiry into whether the FAO Doctrine
substantially eliminates chilling, and, if not, what can be done to achieve
that goal. Part II deals with the "last resort" issue, the burdensomeness
issue and a related matter.
Part III deals with a thesis propounded by my colleague Henry
Monaghan, to the effect that the FAQ Doctrine, properly understood, is
no more than the according of a traditional remedy for protection against
punishment under a void statute."0 This thesis has won substantial
5. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 487 ("If the rule were otherwise, the contours of regulation
would have to be hammered out case by case-and tested only by those hardy enough to risk
criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope of regulation.").
6. The impact of the FAO Doctrine can be gauged from the fact that Lexis lists over 3,000
cases after conducting the following search: overbreadth and (speech or expression or first w/l
amendment).

7. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; accord Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989);
Ferber,458 U.S. at 769.
9. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 485 (1989) (addressing the complaint that a
university resolution prohibiting some commercial activities in dormitories was overbroad).
10. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
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academic support. However, it will be shown that the thesis is not an
alternative rationale for what courts do in an FAO case, but something
very different; in effect, the thesis strips the FAQ Doctrine of its counterchilling function and transforms the FAO remedy accordingly. The
problem is of immediate importance because Monaghan's thesis may
have been the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Board of Trustees
v. Fox," which repudiates the basic premises of the FAQ Doctrine. This
decision is taken up at the end of the Article, not because it is considered
last in importance, but because analysis of the FAQ Doctrine in the
previous pages may be conducive to understanding the decision and its
ramifications.
As observed earlier, the FAO Doctrine is concerned only with overbreadth that is substantial, the reason being that in the absence of
substantiality there is no significant chilling. In the following discussion
the substantiality of the overbreadth in question will be assumed. 2
I. REMEDIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAO DOCTRINE
The FAO Doctrine, which has been described at the outset," is
deceptively simple. Its puzzling features begin to emerge when consideration is given to its remedial implications. But first, a point of terminology will be noted. Practice under the general rule, which requires a

11. 492 U.S. 469 (1989); see also supra text accompanying note 9.
12. In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Court gave utterance for the first time
to the principle that, in cases involving speech, persons not constitutionally protected themselves can
challenge a statute solely on the basis of an unconstitutional burden on the speech of third persons.
See id. at 96-98.
Before and after Thornhill, the Court frequently used the term "overbreadth" interchangeably
with like terms (over-inclusiveness, less (or least) restrictive means, insufficiently narrow tailoring)
in passing on the substantive issue of constitutionality vel non. For extensive discussions of such
cases, see Lawrence A. Alexander, Is There an Overbreadth Doctrine?,22 SAN DiEGO L. REv. 541
(1985); Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, 1044-45 (1983); Note, The First Amendment
OverbreadthDoctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970). These cases are of obvious pertinence in the
FAO context, for FAO relief is unavailable unless the statute is unconstitutional as to third persons.
But their pertinence is essentially limited to that issue. They tell us little, if anything, concerning the
peculiar incidents of the FAO Doctrine itself. At least, they are generally unhelpful with regard to
the issues discussed in this Article, as outlined above.
This is not to say that the FAO Doctrine is unique in allowing a claimant whose own
conduct is not constitutionally protected to assert the rights of persons whose conduct is so protected.
For other exceptions to the rule that claimants may assert only their own constitutional rights, see
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 152-53, 169-95 (4th ed. 1996) (hereinafter HART & WNECHSLER).
13. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
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showing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the conduct of
the claimants themselves, will be referred to as adjudication in the asapplied mode. Practice under the FAQ Doctrine, under which claimants
can prevail by showing the unconstitutionality of the statute as applied
to third persons, will be referred to as adjudication in the FAO mode.
A.

Remand or Invalidation

The Supreme Court has given disparate answers on what follows
upon a holding of overbreadth. In some cases the Court has said that the
consequence of such a holding is that enforcement of the statute must be
suspended until overbreadth is eliminated, after which prior violators
whose conduct is not constitutionally protected can be prosecuted (unless
they can credibly claim unfair surprise from application of the statutory
language as judicially modified). 4 In Osborne v. Ohio, 5 seemingly
unaware of these earlier cases, the Court declared that if a statute is
invalidated for overbreadth, "there [can] be no conviction[] ... even of
those whose ... conduct is unprotected by the First Amendment." 6 A
similar view is apparent in some other recent opinions. 7
It is a basic principle of constitutional adjudication that a statute
should not be held unconstitutional unless the court has first determined
that the statute cannot be saved by a validating construction. 8 This is
14. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 493, 503 & n.12 (1985); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 470, 474 (1974); Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 3 (1973);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490-92 (1965).
15. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
16. Id. at 121.
17. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,482-83 (1989); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491
U.S. 576, 585-86 (1989) (Scalia & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (the language relating to invalidation represented the views of five justices); see also Ada
v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1012 (1992) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist,
CJ., & White, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari).
18. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring). There is much confusion concerning the judicial function with regard to statutory
construction. It is often said that if a statute can be construed in a way that will save it and in a way
that -will destroy it, the court should adopt the saving construction. See, e.g., Anniston Mfg. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 351-52 (1937) (addressing the constitutionality of three provisions of the
Revenue Act of 1936). Similarly, it has been said, perhaps even more often, that a court should
adopt a saving construction if "fairly possible." See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 92 (1985).
Such statements should not be taken to mean that the court must look solely to the words
themselves, as if they existed in a legal vacuum Very commonly, the court does not rest on the
statutory language; what the court calls a saving construction amounts essentially to a rewriting of
the statute to accord with what the court deems to be the legislature's probable intent should the
statutory language prove to be constitutionally defective.
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true in FAO cases as well. But a finding of overbreadth is the first step

in this process, for a court cannot proceed meaningfully with the
construction issue unless it determines in what respects, if any, the statute
Thus, in Anniston, a federal statute spelled out with great specificity the nature of the proof
incumbent on a claimant entitled to a refund from the government. See Anniston, 301 U.S. at 341.
In response to the argument that it would be impossible to supply the requisite proof in some
situations, the Court read into the statute an exception for such cases, stating that it declined to
attribute to Congress "an intent to defy the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 351.
Similarly illustrative is PanamaRailroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924), where a
federal statute conferring certain rights on maritime workers if they sued at common law was held
to confer the same rights (except entitlement to jury trial) if they sued in admiralty. See id.at 38990. The statute clearly provided otherwise, but the Court was of the view that a literal reading would
present "a grave question ... respecting [the statute's] constitutional validity." Id. at 390. For cases
on the state level, see People v. Fitzgerald, 573 P.2d 100, 103-04 (Colo. 1978) (en bane)
(overcoming an overbreadth challenge by construing a statute outlawing the making of "unreasonable
noise" to apply only when there is a "'clear and present danger of violence or where the
communication is not intended as such but is merely a guise to disturb persons"' (quoting In re
Brown, 510 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Cal. 1973))); and Insurance Co. of North America v. Russell, 271
S.E.2d 178, 181 (Ga. 1980) (holding a statute unconstitutional because of discrimination between
widows and widowers and construing it to treat them equally as the "best [way] to facilitate
legislative intent where the expressed intent... [could not] be carried out').
The rendition of a saving construction in lieu of statutory invalidation is not a mere matter
ofjudicial preference. The saving construction can best be understood as submission to the principle
of legislative supremacy. As the Supreme Court has said, in saving a statute the court is fulfilling
its "duty" to the legislature. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330-31 (1988); United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954); see also Leeman v. State, 357 So. 2d 703, 705 (Fla. 1978)
(regarding the duty of state courts towards state legislatures). This involves effectuating the intent
of the legislature to the extent compatible with the judicial function. If, say, an obscenity statute is
found to reach too far in its definition of obscenity, it can fairly be inferred that the legislature would
have "wanted" to punish at least the hardeore pornographer. Indeed, in such a case the Court
declared a contrary supposition as to the legislature's intent to be "frivolous" and saved the statute
by striking out an invalidating term. See Brockett, 472 U.S. at 505-07.
On the state level, this is illustrated by cases where the courts have written into state
obscenity statutes the latest doctrinal wrinkles announced by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 755-56 n.7 (1982) (listing cases in which state courts have 'judicially
incorporated the Miller test for obscenity").
Often enough a court will say, as the Supreme Court did in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964), that it will not engage in "rewriting" a statute to save it. See id. at 515. while
courts are hardly steadfast in this regard, there may be good reasons for declining to "rewrite." Thus,
a court is not warranted in doing so if a particular saving construction is one that the legislature
would not have "wanted," or if there is no reasonable basis for inferring what the legislature would
have "wanted," or, even assuming the legislative intent to be clear, the court lacks competence to
do the job, as where special expertise or fact-finding capacity is needed in the particular case. In any
event, the court should act judiciously concerning the degree to which it takes on the job of
correcting legislative error. Doing too much is incompatible with the limited role of the judiciary in
American constitutional systems. Wholesale rewriting is problematic, even if it can be surmised that
the legislature would have wanted the court to tear up the old statute and write a new one.
Finally, it should be evident that since federal courts cannot render authoritative constructions
of state statutes, special problems arise when a state statute is before a federal court. See United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971).
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needs to be saved; 9 and the court must then decide, if saving is needed,
whether a particular construction is constitutionally adequate. A
determination of overbreadth vel non is necessarily in the foreground."
The court that makes the finding of overbreadth may or may not be the

court that decides the issue of construction. Preliminary focus on the role
of the particular court may be useful in connection with many of the
problems discussed in this Article.
When the Supreme Court reviews a state court judgment pertaining
to a state statute, the Supreme Court cannot render an authoritative
construction of the statute and probably lacks authority even to try.2
Accordingly, the traditional practice of the Court upon finding constitutional taint in a state statute is to remand the case to the state court for
proceedings not inconsistent with the holding.' This has been its
practice in FAQ cases as well.'

19. It may seem at first blush that an overbroad statute can be saved simply by a construction
in which the valid part applicable to the claimant is separable from the remainder. This is not true.
In the as-applied mode, the only question is whether that portion of the statute applicable to the
claimant is valid. The question of separability does not arise except as a matter of construction,
which, with regard to a state statute, does not present a federal question. See infra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text. Whereas the as-applied mode inquiry is directed to what is right with the statute,
the FAO mode inquiry is directed to what is wrong with the statute. Overbreadth must be eliminated.
Only then does it become relevant, as a matter of construction, whether the valid part applicable to
the claimant is separable from the part or parts that were eliminated. See infra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text.
20. There has been much discussion of the relationship between overbreadth and vagueness
in the FAO context. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1030-37 (2d
ed. 1988). Here it may be remarked that if a vague statute exerts a chilling effect on speech, it may
become a basis for invoking the FAO Doctrine. The subject is further discussed in Alfred Hill,
Constitutional Vagueness Doctrine: A Revolution Unremarkedand Unstable (forthcoming) (on file
with the Hofstra Law Review).
21. On review of a state court judgment in a pre-FAO case, Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286,
291 (1924) (Brandeis, J.), the Court asserted its power to decide an unsettled question of state law
but said that it was not "obliged" to do so. In fact, the Court did not do so in the particular case, nor
did it cite other cases where it had.
It is questionable whether Dorchy's assertion of power to decide such a state question on
review of a state court judgment comports with limitations on the Supreme Court's statutory
jurisdiction, as expounded in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
22. See Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 52 (1992) (remanding a case after holding that an
aggravating factors statute, as applied to death penalty cases, was unconstitutionally vague).
23. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 77 (1981); Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974).
The Court should not refrain from a remand on the ground that, in its view, the statute is
not likely to be saved, this is something the Court cannot predict. In Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216-17 (1975), the state courts had upheld an ordinance against a claim
of unconstitutionality. The Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance for overbreadth and reversed
without a remand. See id. Its explanation was that the possibility of a limiting construction was
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Federal habeas corpus proceedings instituted by state prisoners are
characterized by what is, in effect, a remand procedure essentially similar
to that employed by the Supreme Court in FAO cases.24 It is doubtful
that, having determined the existence of overbreadth, the habeas judge
can deal with the problem more broadly than is necessary for dealing
with the immediate habeas petition, but this issue has not surfaced.
At the trial court level there is neither a remand nor suspension of
enforcement. Consider an overbreadth attack in a unitary jurisdiction
(state court/state statute; federal court/federal statute). The court cannot
say, in effect, "We find the statute overbroad and order its enforcement
suspended pending such time as we decide whether or not the statute can
be saved by a limiting construction." This would be consistent with the
goals of the FAO Doctrine but would be contrary to the traditional rule
that a statute cannot be invalidated unless it has first been determined
that the statute cannot be saved.' Upon a finding of overbreadth, a
court of the unitary jurisdiction must either save the statute or invalidate
it, and this seems to be the universal practice.26
The situation is the same when a federal district court considers an
action for anticipatory relief against operation of a state statute on the
ground of overbreadth. The federal court can only guess at the construction that would be given to the statute by the state courts, and its task is
further complicated for reasons that will not be pursued here. Still, the
overbroad statute is invalidated only after a determination is made that
the statute cannot be saved. Either way, the federal court is obliged to

remote-largely for the surprising reasons that (1) the state courts had already upheld the statute

against constitutional attack, and (2) the city had offered "several distinct justifications for the
ordinance in its broadest terms." Id. at 217. But this happened before the Supreme Court announced
the unconstitutionality of the ordinance and was hardly a basis for predicting what the state courts

would have done (or what the city would have argued) if confronted with the unconstitutionality of
the ordinance as written.

24. As a prerequisite for relief, the prisoner is bound to have raised the constitutional issue in
the state courts. See 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5.3 (1988). Where the habeas court finds error, the prisoner is set free if he cannot be punished.
See id. § 8.5. But if the prisoner remains subject to punishment without impairment of constitutional

rights (e.g., after a new trial), the court orders a conditional release-the condition being that the
state conduct such furtherproceedings as would afford vindication of the constitutional claim upheld
in the habeas proceeding. See id.
25. See supra text accompanying note 8.
26. See, e.g., Phelps v. Hamilton, 828 F. Supp. 831, 847-50 (D. Kan. 1993) (invalidating the
statute); United States v. Lambert, 446 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1978), aff'd sub nom. United States
v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1979) (adopting a saving construction).
27. See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971); supra note 18;
infra note 70.
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make a final disposition of the case; suspension of enforcement is not an
option."
A federal court of appeals reviews the judgments of only inferior
federal courts and corrects their errors, if any; the Supreme Court plays
a comparable role when it reviews federal judgments.29 State appellate
tribunals perform the same function with regard to state judgments.3"
B.

The Effect of Invalidation

Consider the case of a statutory provision that outlaws advocating
the violent overthrow of the government. Since advocacy, without more,
is constitutionally protected,3" the provision is invalid, and nobody is
punishable under it. But a statute may contain valid as well as invalid
provisions. That, by definition, is the kind of statute involved in an FAO
case, where the Court acts at the behest of a violator whose own conduct
is not constitutionally protected.32 What the courts refer to as invalidation in such a case follows upon a holding that otherpartsof the statute
are unconstitutional as written, and that the statute is not amenable to a

28. Presumably, an overbreadth challenge to a federal statute can be made in a state court. But
any attempt to block federal enforcement would encounter serious obstacles. See HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 467-68. Another possible scenario would be one in which a federal
statute is asserted to override an otherwise applicable state statute, and the federal statute is attacked
for overbreadth. In principle, if overbreadth is established, the attack should succeed. The Author
is unaware of any cases dealing with these problems.
29. See id. (discussing federal and Supreme Court jurisdiction).
30. See id. at 450-52.
31. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
32. This is how the Court has repeatedly formulated the Doctrine. See cases cited supra note
21. The point is emphasized in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), which is discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 94-105.
The formulation is inadequate in that it does not set limits on the reach of the Doctrine.
Invalidation of an entire statute, or suspension of its operation, may sometimes be excessive.
Suppose that a city's traffic code contains a provision on resisting arrest that places punitive
restrictions on motorists attempting to justify their conduct to an arresting officer. No matter how
outrageous such a provision is, it makes no sense to condemn the entire traffic code when a saving
construction is not feasible. A less drastic solution is called for in such a case. This general problem
has not been considered by the Supreme Court.
The formulation of the Doctrine is also defective in confining the Doctrine's operation to
cases where there is a claimant who has violated a valid part of a statute. When a statute contains
multiple parts that are all unconstitutional, the as-applied mode of adjudication applies, so that
claimants have standing to assert only that their own constitutional rights were violated. Even when
they are successful, the parts of the statute not bearing on their conduct are left standing. It would
be anomalous to act against chilling when the statute is unconstitutional only in part but never when
it is unconstitutional in all of its parts. Unfortunately, Board of Trustees v. Fox points in this
direction.
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saving construction. A holding that part of a statute
is unconstitutional
33
does not result in nullification of its valid parts.
In principle, therefore, one who has violated the valid part of a
statute remains subject to its sanctions. But it seems generally to be
assumed that the successful FAO claimant goes free, since the Court
often uses language--carelessly, it seems to this writer-suggesting that
an overbroad statute has indeed been nullified in its entirety. 4 The
argument here is only that successful FAO claimants ought not to go free
for no better reason other than the Court has used broad language of
invalidation. Such persons are typically hardcore violators, since these are
typically the ones who are prosecuted. They receive a windfall, and the
state is burdened in its efforts to eradicate such egregious abuses as child
pornography. These costs would be supportable if letting successful FAO
claimants go would somehow serve the purposes of the FAO Doctrine.
The consequences of a successful outcome in an FAO case can be

33. Even when a Court has purportedly invalidated a statute in its entirety, that does not result
in nullification of parts of a statute whose constitutionality was not in issue and passed upon. See
Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam).
34. When a statute is unconstitutional as written (or construed), the prevailing practice is to
declare that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. Starting with United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 745 (1987), the Court has taken to saying that a statute should not be facially invalidated
unless it is invalid in its entirety. But distinct parts of a statute may be unconstitutional as written
or construed; before and sometimes even after Salerno, the Court has declared that such parts were
facially unconstitutional. Still, use of the Salerno formulation persists. This development is discussed
in Alfred Hill, Facialand As-Applied Invalidation ofStatutes (forthcoming) (on file with the Hofstra
Law Review).
This development is mentioned because the Court frequently speaks in terms of facial
invalidation in FAO cases. See Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574
(1987) ("A statute may be invalidated on its face.., only if the overbreadth is 'substantial."'); City
of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,461 (1987) ("We... invalidated the ordinance [in Lewis v. City
ofNew Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974)] as facially overbroad."); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
769 (1982) ("[O]verbreadth... [must] be 'substantial' before the statute involved will be invalidated
on its face."); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[The Court] cannot, with
confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the
statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe.'); see also Ada v. Guam
Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1012 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("We have applied to statutes restricting speech a so-called 'overbreadth'
doctrine, rendering such a statute invalid in all its applications (Le., facially invalid) if it is invalid
in any of them.').
In Dombrowski v. Pister,380 U.S. 479 (1965), where the FAO Doctrine received its first
modem treatment, the Court prescribed facial scrutiny of the challenged statute. Evidently, the Court
was concerned that scrutiny should not be confined to the provisions that applied to the claimant
personally, as would be the case under the general rule that only first-person rights can be
vindicated. See id. at 490-91. It is a far cry from this to facial invalidation, if facial invalidation is
taken to mean that the entire statute is nullified. The question, however, has never been addressed
by the Court.
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anything the Court wants them to be.35
One argument for freeing the successful claimant is that it would
tend to deter legislatures from writing overbroad statutes. Thus, the Court
has justified granting immunity to violators on the ground that the
legislature needs to be punished for enacting an unconstitutional statute
in the first place. According to the Court, the legislature should not be
'
allowed to get off without "paying" for its "mistakes."36
This notion is not a familiar one. To be sure, the judiciary
sometimes punishes the executive, as in the case of the exclusionary
rule.37 But a punitive measure aimed, as the exclusionary rule has been
rationalized, at deterring misconduct by the police is not quite the same
as a punitive measure designed to make the legislature more sensitive to
constitutional imperatives. Punishing the legislature for careless drafting
in this respect is likely to be as effective as punishing inferior courts (if
that were feasible) for allowing constitutional error to creep into their
opinions. No doubt legislators sometimes vote for a statute in the
expectation that the courts will invalidate it, but this must be relatively
rare. Meting out wholesale punishment to achieve deterrence in these few
situations seems injudicious." What is needed is guidance, not punishment.
A more plausible basis for allowing past violators to go free is that
they would otherwise have no incentive to seek FAO relief. It is not clear
that sufficient incentive would be lacking.39 However, the purposes of
the FAO Doctrine would be advanced if at least a particular class of
violators were given immunity from punishment, as will be argued
below.

35. The significance of invalidation is elusive even apart from the point made in this Article.
See Hill, supra note 34.
36. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 121 (1990); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576,
586 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,492 (1976) ("Evidence obtained by police officers

in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that the frequency of future
violations will decrease.:).
38. The problem is discussed more fully by Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr. in Making Sense
ofOverbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 888 & n.221, 889 (1991). Fallon believes legislatures would be

deterred. See id. at 888 n.221, 898-903.
39. The typical claimant contends that his or her conduct is constitutionally protected. Adding
an FAO ground poses no meaningful burden and adds another issue. Multiple issues are conducive
to delay as cases wend their way up and down the appellate ladder, and with delay there is the
possibility that the prosecutor (perhaps a new one) will agree to a lesser charge or even drop the
case.
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The Problem of Chilling

A striking feature of the present state of the law is that the chilling
effect of an overbroad statute is not alleviated significantly with regard
to conduct antedating an invalidation or saving construction. Violators
cannot place reliance on the possibility of invalidation, since, for all they
know, the statute may receive a saving construction instead. For chilling
to be alleviated, there must be protection for the violator whether the
statute is invalidated or saved.
The Supreme Court's position that a saving construction opens the
door to punishment of past violators is based on uncritical application of
the rule regarding the curative effect of such a construction." This rule
seems to be an aspect of the traditional principle that accords retroactive
effect to judicial decisions.4 No doubt there are weighty reasons for this
principle, but it should not be blindly followed when to do so would
defeat appropriate measures of constitutional implementation. If the
impetus to avoid the chilling effect of an overbroad statute is strong
enough to support departure from the principle that only first-person
constitutional rights may be vindicated, then it is strong enough,
arguably, to warrant pro tanto departure from the retroactivity principle,
in the interest of tailoring an FAO remedy that does not trench unnecessarily on important governmental interests. The Supreme Court has not
considered such a possibility.
It does not follow that realizing the counterchilling purpose of the
FAO Doctrine requires that all violators go free. At least in theory, one
can distinguish between hardcore and softcore violators, with the former
defined, for present purposes, as persons who cannot credibly assert that
they believe their activity to be constitutionally protected.42 Such
persons do not need protection from chilling and giving it to them
needlessly burdens the state in its efforts to eradicate proscribable

40. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 115-17.
41. In the criminal law context, the hardship of the principle is mitigated by the rule that
retroactivity must not occasion unfair surprise. See Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 315 (1972).
The principle has been eroded on the civil side. See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,
105-09 (1971) (holding that a Louisiana statute of limitations could not be applied retroactively).
42. Like some other terms in this Article, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, these are
used for convenience. The concern here is not solely with obscenity statutes. In the case of any
statute invalidly burdening speech, persons whose conduct is not constitutionally protected, but not
hardcore in character, can by analogy be called soficore violators.
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evils.43 Whether softcore violators are deserving of exoneration is beside
the point; as a practical matter, unless they receive exoneration, the
shadow of chilling cannot be significantly lifted from persons who might
otherwise choose to avoid risk altogether by yielding to a statutory ban
on constitutionally protected conduct.' An advantage of such an
approach, apart from its utility in curtailing chilling, is that it would
impose a minimal burden on law enforcement since softcore violators are
not often proceeded against, so far as one can tell from the reported
cases.
The suggestion for modification of the FAO Doctrine can be simply
put: (1) a saving construction would be retroactive only with regard to
the hardcore violator; and (2) an "invalidation" would be effective only
with regard to the softcore violator.
It must be added that the Supreme Court has expressed sharp
hostility to this approach insofar as it relates to the saving construction.
In Osborne, the claimant had contended that when a statute is overbroad,
antecedent conduct should not be punishable, despite a saving construction.45 The Court replied that if such a remedial consequence inhered in
the FAO Doctrine, this "would very likely invite reconsideration or
redefinition of the doctrine in a way that would not serve First Amendment interests." But the claimant was clearly a hardcore violator who
had been convicted of child pornography.47 The Court did not consider
the possibility of different treatment for softcore violators."
As matters stand, the FAO Doctrine significantly fails to eliminate
the chilling effect of overbreadth on protected speech.49 It does not

43. It has been suggested in dictum that hardeore violators should be disqualified from seeking

FAO relief altogether. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,147-48 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965). The point was made in a
narrow context in Dombrowski and more broadly in Brown. But the Court has never followed
through in this matter, which is fortunate. For hardcore violators are the ones most commonly pro-

ceeded against; an overbroad statute could remain on the books for years before it is challenged by
a softcore violator having the requisite standing.
44. Alternative approaches to the problem of a suitable FAO remedy are discussed from a

different point of view in Fallon, supra note 38, at 890-92.
45. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 121-22.

46. Id. at 122; see also Monaghan, supra note 10, at 14-23 (noting the earlier criticism of
commentators who had argued broadly against allowance of the saving construction in an FAO

context).
47. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 106-07.

48. See id.
49. It has been observed that people are typically unaware of what statutes actually provide,
and that they know even less of what are to them inaccessible judicial opinions that may be the
definitive sources of what the statutes really mean. Is it therefore realistic to talk about the chilling
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follow that the Doctrine serves no useful purpose. The Doctrine
significantly accelerates the elimination of overbreadth, and that is no
small thing.
II.

THE "LAST RESORT" FALLACY AND OTHER MISCONCEPTIONS

The Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized the FAO Doctrine
as "strong medicine," to be imposed "sparingly and only as a last
resort."50 Presumably, this apprehension of burden underlies the Court's
frequent strictures that FAO relief should be denied if the challenged
statute is susceptible of a saving construction in a single action." But
the "strong medicine" characterization is greatly exaggerated, and the
"susceptibility" basis for denying FAO relief is mystifying. Further, there
is no hesitancy in the imposition of such relief.
A.

The "Last Resort" Fallacy

There is no evidence that the Supreme Court is heeding its own
counsel of imposing FAO relief "sparingly and only as a last resort," or
that the inferior courts, federal and state, are doing so. It is submitted that

effect of overbreadth? Undoubtedly, one who obstructs a policeman in the heat of argument would
have done so irrespective of the provisions of the applicable statute. As observed by Hart and
Wechsler, the more likely case of chilling is one involving "conduct... planned in advance." HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 204.
The familiar adage that people are presumed to know the law usually means that they are
presumed to know what a competent lawyer would advise. Unquestionably, some persons engaged
in "planned activity"--for example, publishers and media entities generally-do consult lawyers. But
it would take an ungenerous attitude towards freedom of expression to insist that the FAO Doctrine
be enforced only upon a showing that its benefits would extend to such persons, or at least to
persons sufficiently sophisticated to know the actual contents of statutes. In any event, the problems
of proof would often be overwhelming. A presumption of knowledge of the law makes sense, not
only for the purpose of inflicting punishment, but also for the purpose of eliminating fear of
punishment in consequence of overbreadth.
Of course, the presumption should not be carried to the point of assuming foreknowledge
that sanctions for violation of an overbroad statute will be disallowed. Such circularity would
undermine the FAO Doctrine altogether. The reach of a presumption should be limited in accordance
with the ends it is designed to serve.
50. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
51. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,468 (1987); Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975); Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972); see also Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.,
482 U.S. 569, 575 (1987) (holding that it was not possible to apply a limiting construction to the
statute before the Court); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965) (holding it was not
possible to rehabilitate the Louisiana statute in a single action).
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the reason is the incompatibility of such restraint with implementation of
the FAO Doctrine.
The problem of past violations aside, the crux of the Doctrine is
accelerating the elimination of overbreadth, whether by "invalidation" or
by a saving construction. If the statute is not judicially salvageable in
whole or in part, the task of repairing the damage, assuming it can be
repaired, falls upon the legislature. But this is something that must
happen sooner or later to that particular statute--usually later under the
as-applied mode and sooner under the FAO mode.
Even if perturbed by the hardship consequent upon acceleration of
this process, it does not appear that the Court sees the solution as an
adoption of an approach to the asserted unconstitutionality affecting third
persons that is more latitudinarian than the approach taken in the case of
parties asserting their own rights to constitutional protection; there is
nothing in the Court's opinions to indicate that the Court has adopted
such a double standard. It is probable that all the Court has in mind is
that a statute should not be "invalidated" if it can be saved. But
acceleration of the saving construction is not attainable unless the
deciding court, upon a showing of substantial overbreadth, is obliged to
choose between saving the statute or "invalidating" it." To say that
FAO relief may be imposed only as a last resort is to emasculate the
FAO Doctrine insofar as it works to curb overbreadth through the saving
construction-it is to say, in effect, that despite an ample showing of
overbreadth, only as a last resort may a court be forbidden recourse to
the as-applied mode. In this mode, overbreadth affecting only third
persons is irrelevant, so that the problem of a saving construction does
not even come up.
B.

The "Susceptibility" Test

In Dombrowski v. Pfister, the Court for the first time declared that
FAO relief should be denied if the statute attacked for overbreadth is one
that is susceptible to a saving construction in a single action." In that
situation, as the Court saw it, the as-applied mode serves to eliminate
overbreadth without the need for "hammering out" the valid contours of
the statute in successive prosecutions.54 Accordingly, there is simply no
need to proceed in the FAO mode in such a case. The "susceptibility"

52. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.

53. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 489-91.
54. See id. at 487.
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point has frequently been reiterated by the Court.5 Yet, except for the
single case mentioned below," FAO relief has never been denied on the
"susceptibility" ground by the Supreme Court, or any other court as far
as the Author is aware." Reasons are not hard to find.
Assume that the state's highest court has rejected an FAO claim,
and that its judgment is under review by the Supreme Court. Assume
further that the statute is one that can easily be given a saving construction in a single action. Withholding FAO relief on this basis would be
senseless and futile since the state courts, if they acted in good faith,
believe the statute to be constitutional. Without guidance from the
Supreme Court, why should it be assumed that the state court will
reverse itself in some future action? Denial of FAO relief in these
circumstances would be perverse in its perpetuation of the chilling effect
of the statute. In no such case has FAO relief been denied. On the other
hand, if the state court has sustained an FAO claim, there is no point to
an unguided directive that tells it, in effect, to think about the problem
some more. If the state court has not, directly or by necessary implication, passed upon an FAO claim, there is no FAO issue before the
Supreme Court. In short, the "susceptibility" test seems to make no sense
when the Supreme Court sits in review of a state judgment.
Even more clearly, the test makes no sense in the courts of a unitary
jurisdiction. If an overbreadth case comes to the court in the as-applied
mode, and the statute can be given an adequate limiting construction
within the confines of the as-applied mode, that should be done. If it
cannot be done, that becomes the basis for proceeding in the FAO mode.
The denial of FAO relief cannot be justified on the theory that the statute
might yet be saved in some later action."
There are additional considerations when a federal court deals with
an anticipatory attack on a state statute. If the courts of the state have
previously upheld the statute against constitutional attack in another case,

55. See supra text accompanying note 51,
56. See infra text accompanying note 60.
57. When a federal court grants FAO relief after declaring that the statute is not readily

susceptible of a saving construction, this may reflect only the court's view that the statute cannot
be saved, readily or otherwise. This is illustrated in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d

691, 696 (4th Cir. 1986). The subsequent proceedings in this case are discussed in Virginia v.
American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383 (1988).

58. This would be tantamount to abstention, which may be justified when the controlling issue
of law is subject to an authoritative ruling by the courts of another jurisdiction, see infra text
accompanying notes 63-64, and which in any event is strongly disfavored in FAO actions, see infra
text accompanying note 62.
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relegating the federal claimant to the state courts on the "susceptibility"

ground would be perverse, as previously argued in the discussion relating
to the Supreme Court. 9 On the other hand, if the state courts have not

passed on the constitutional issue, it is at least arguable, absent obstacles
to such a course, that it is appropriate to let the state courts proceed to
that issue first. Such a course was prescribed in Young v. American Mini
Theatres." But this is comparable to the use of the Pullman abstention,6' which the Court has said, before and since, that it strongly
disfavors in FAO cases.62
In fact, such a course is more far-reaching than the Pullman
abstention; for, under Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,63 federal
relief is not withheld but postponed; the federal claimant is consigned to
the state courts only when the statute is unclear' and when it seems
possible that the state courts might construe it in a way that would render
unnecessary the decision of a constitutional question. Thus, Pullman is
consistent with the basic rule that a federal court having jurisdiction

59. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
60. 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976); see also Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482
U.S. 569, 575 (1987) (containing dictum that impliedly approves such a procedure).
61. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). Under the Pullman
abstention, the federal court refrains from deciding the federal constitutional question pending
resolution in the state court of an issue of state law that might moot the constitutional issue.
62. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,467-68 (1987); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 489-92 (1965); see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment but disagreeing with the Court's
refusal to apply the Pullman abstention).

63. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
64. In Pullman, the state statute was, in fact, unclear. See id. at 499. Subsequent cases have
emphasized that the Pullman abstention is appropriate only when the statute is unclear. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971) (stating that to rule otherwise would "negate
the ... enlargement of the jurisdiction of the federal district courts").
Since the purpose is to avoid unnecessary decisions on constitutional questions, the Pullman
abstention makes equal sense when the statute is clear since the state might give the statute a
limiting construction in order to avoid its complete nullification. A rational Pullman doctrine would
require abstention except when a speedier disposition is desirable, as in cases of civil liberties and
civil rights, and in cases involving financial burden that would be excessive under the circumstances.
Cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (involving a claimant
with a $6,800 judgment for personal property loss under a floater insurance policy and the dissenting
opinion decrying the "practice of making litigants travel a long, expensive road in order to obtain
justice"). This litigation was terminated upon a second trip to the Supreme Court. See Clay v. Sun
Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
In principle, the "importance of speed" in the particular case, Bellottiv. Baird,428 U.S. 132,
151 (1976), may counsel against use of an available state certification procedure for the same reasons
that it may counsel against the Pullman abstention, although a state procedure that allows direct
access to the highest court of the state may tip the balance in favor of certification. See id.; HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 1245-46.
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under the governing law is bound to exercise that jurisdiction when duly
invoked, despite the presence of troublesome issues governed by state
law. 5 There is no evidence that the Supreme Court has thought through
the implications of abstention on the basis of a "susceptibility" test.
In sum, that test is without any pertinence except in the limited type
of case last discussed, and there its role is dubious.
C. How Strong Is the FAO Doctrine's "Strong Medicine?"
When the Supreme Court first characterized FAO relief as "strong
medicine," it was because, as the Court said, "enforcement of [the]
statute ... is totally forbidden" until the elimination of overbreadth."
But suspension of enforcement is something that happens only when the
Supreme Court (or an intermediate appellate court) remands following a
determination of overbreadth. The trial courts are then required to dispose
of the overbreadth issue with finality in the very same case---the same
disposition that, absent error, they would have achieved in the first
instance. 7 Any delays as such are incidental to other kinds of constitutional adjudication as well. Injunctions against enforcement are not
peculiar to FAO cases. 8
To be sure, if the outcome is invalidation of the statute, that is
indeed burdensome since legislation is needed to fill the gap resulting
from the voiding of the statute, and that may take some time. But this is
always the effect of statutory invalidation.69 What is distinctive about
an FAO case is that invalidation may come sooner than if only the asapplied mode were available for the constitutional challenge. But this in
itself is not a legitimate ground for complaint of hardship. The as-applied
mode, under which only first-person claims are acted upon, is founded
not upon any concern for the convenience of the legislature, but rather
upon concern for the proper institutional role of the judicial branch.7"

65. This is, of course, exemplified by the diversity jurisdiction.
66. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.

68. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 854-57.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.

70. There is an aspect of the FAO Doctrine's operation that can be burdensome, but this may
be curable. When an anticipatory action is brought in a federal district court against operation of a
state statute, the court may decide against a saving construction in the mistaken assumption that this
is what the state courts would have done. This should not cause lasting damage since the federal

court can modify its coercive decree to take account of the later action in the state courts. Further,
even temporary burdensomeness, occasioned by such a mistake as to state law, can be avoided by
adoption, with appropriate modification, of the procedure employed in Virginia v. American
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m.

MONAGHAN'S THESIS AND THE OPINION IN

Fox

Board of Trustees v. Fox,7' the case mentioned in the Introduction,
threatens a restrictive application of the FAO Doctrine. This follows
largely from the Court's statement in Fox that the FAO Doctrine is a
"necessary means of vindicating the plaintiff's own right not to be bound
by a statute that is unconstitutional."'72 The statement was made

conclusorily and without attribution, but it is a paraphrase of language in
a 1970 Note in the HarvardLaw Review.73 The Note did not argue that
this characterization is the only valid aspect of the FAO Doctrine.74
In 1981 my colleague Henry Monaghan did take such a view and
developed his position at some length.75 Monaghan's thesis has been

influential, with endorsements by two leading constitutional law
treatises.76 It has been much referred to, but rarely questioned, by
commentators.' However, what is most important is that it appears to

Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383 (1988). Development of this point here would take us too far afield.
71. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
72. Id. at 485.
73. See Note, supranote 12, at 848 ("As a theoretical matter the claimant is asserting his own
right not to be burdened by an unconstitutional rule of law. ...'". The passage quoted appears in
a discussion of whether the FAO Doctrine can be rationalized as simply an aspect of as-applied
adjudication. See id.
74. In a later passage, the Note states: "Once the chilling effect of overbreadth on privileged
primary activity is taken seriously, the inadequacy of as applied review becomes evident." Id. at 858.
75. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 4 (quoting language from the Note, supra note 12).
76. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.8, at 947 &
n.35, 948 (4th ed. 1991); TRIBE, supra note 20, at 1023-24.
77. Monaghan's views are endorsed by several authors. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure
of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221, 244 & n.105 (1988); William Trosch, Comment, The Third
Generation of LoiteringLaws Goes to Court: Do Laws That Criminalize "Loiteringwith Intent to
Sell Drugs" Pass ConstitutionalMuster?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 513, 535-39 (1993); see also George P.
Choundas, Comment, Neither Equal Nor Protected: The Invisible Law of Equal Protection, The
Legal Invisibility of Its Gender-Based Victims, 44 EMORY LJ.1069, 1158 (1995) ("[Monaghan's]
comprehensive treatment of overbreadth theory [is] popularly considered among the most authoritative.'.
In addition, Monaghan's views have received limited endorsement by other authors. See
Michael C. Doff, FacialChallenges to State and FederalStatutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235, 262-64
(1994); Fallon, supra note 38, at 862, 874-75, 889. See infra note 93 for a discussion of the views
of Dorf and Fallon.
As of this writing, these five articles are among 130 listed by Lexis as citing Monaghan's
Overbreadth,supranote 10. Of the other 125 articles, only two are critical, and in both the criticism
is summary in character. Professor Martin Redish says only that Monaghan's thesis is "conclusory
and unresponsive." Redish, supra note 12, at 1040. Professor Lawrence Sager states that Monaghan's
thesis is questionable because it is limited to the First Amendment and also because of incompatibility with the substantiality requirement. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword:State Courts and the
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have surfaced in Fox.7" The significance of what the Court said in Fox

is probably best understood if attention is first directed to Monaghan's
analysis of the problem.
A.

Monaghan's Thesis

According to Monaghan, the FAO Doctrine, when properly
understood, has made no change in our constitutional jurisprudence. He

believes that the Doctrine is simply the application, in the First Amendment context, of a more general rule: "the conventional principle that any
litigant may insist on not being burdened by a constitutionally invalid
rule."79 As he sees it, if the statute impairs the constitutionally protected

conduct of others, it is unconstitutional in its entirety-unless that part
of it applicable to the defendant is separable and valid standing alone."
Monaghan does not distinguish between state and federal statutes.
He recognizes that, in the as-applied mode, the Court considers the issue
of unconstitutionality only in relation to the conduct of the claimant.8
But he contends that the Supreme Court's holdings in the as-applied
mode make constitutional sense only if seen as resting on a "presumption" that the valid and invalid terms of the statute are separable. For this
proposition Monaghan cites Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad v.
Jackson Tinegar Co.,82 which involved the review of a state court
judgment. The pertinent language of the Court is set out below, and the
Author does not see in it any talk of a presumption.83 Nor is such talk

Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 967 &
n.22 (1985). For a discussion on the substantiality requirement, see infra text accompanying notes
88-89.
78. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1989).
79. Monaghan, supra note 10, at 37.
80. See id. at 14-23.
81. See id. at 4-5.
82. 226 U.S. 217 (1912).
83. The railroad had argued that, assuming the statute was constitutional as applied to the
actual conduct in the case, it was unconstitutional in other regards, and therefore should not be
applied to it. Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court said:
[T]his court must deal with the case in hand and not with imaginary ones. It suffices,
therefore, to hold that, as applied to cases like the present, the statute is valid. How the
state court may apply it to other cases, whether its general words may be treated as more
or less restrained, and how far parts of it may be sustained if others fail are matters upon
which we need not speculate now.
Id. at 219-20. Comparable language may be found in Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160-61
(1907).
If Monaghan's theory of a presumption is correct, the question arises why it should not be
equally applicable in a case involving freedom of expression, with the result that a statute impairing
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to be found in other cases so far as the Author is aware?8
To be sure, one who violates a statute is entitled to exoneration
upon showing that (1) the statute is unconstitutional as to others, and (2)
the terms of the statute are not separable. But even if rejection of such
a defense is erroneous under the governing law, it does not follow that
the claimant has been denied a right derived from the Constitution. Assume the argument is made in a state court that a statute of the state
violates the federal constitution in its application to third persons, and
also that its provisions are nonseparable. The claim of nonseparability
does not arise under the Constitution, but rather under the law of the
state. This is obvious when the statute contains an express separability
clause." In the absence of such a clause, the claim rests upon construction of the statute. If the state legislature intended nonseparability, and
the state court concludes otherwise, the court may have failed in its duty
to the legislature but has done nothing that offends the federal constitution.
The same analysis should control when a claim is made, in a federal
court, that the provisions of a federal statute are nonseparable. If the
claim is not frivolous and timely raised, the federal court is bound to
consider it, but only in deference to congressional paramountcy on this
point. A claim that the federal court failed in its duty to Congress is
hardly enough to support an argument that the claimant's constitutional
rights were violated thereby; otherwise every adverse ruling on the
construction of a federal statute could be transmuted into a claim of
deprivation of a constitutional right. Similarly, state judicial "error" in

that freedom would survive challenge if the claimant violated a valid part of the statute. But
according to Monaghan, there is "little scope for application of the Yazoo separability 'presumption'
in the First Amendment context," apparently for the reason that in that context a court may not
enforce a statute without stripping it of its unconstitutional elements. Monaghan, supra note 10, at
29. Professor Fallon believes that Monaghan has "no adequate account" of why this should be so,
Fallon, supra note 38, at 872 & n. 115, and this Author agrees.
84. Monaghan refers to Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160 (1894),
where, in dictum, the Court spoke approvingly of a state court declaration that "[t]he constitutional
validity of law is to be tested not by what has been done under it, but by what may, by its authority,
be done." Id. at 169-70 (quoting Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 188 (1878)). The statement supports
Monaghan's thesis, but is inconsistent with the as-applied mode of constitutional adjudication. He
cites but one case where the Court acted compatibly with this quoted dictum, Wuchter v. Pizzutti,

276 U.S. 13 (1928), which invalidated a service of process statute. He then observes, however, that
Wuchter "is vulnerable to criticism for ignoring the 'Yazoo presumption."' Monaghan, supra note
10, at 12 n.49. Otherwise, the cases he cites do not support his position. A case somewhat similar
to Wuchter is Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).

85. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S. Ct. 2068,2069-70 (1996) (deciding the constitutionality
of a Utah abortion statute and stating that "[s]everability is of course a matter of state law").
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construing a state statute is not a ground for claiming violation even of
the state constitution. To assume that a statute that is unenforceable by
reason of nonseparability is necessarily unconstitutional is simply
fallacious.

6

Judicial arbitrariness in construing a state statute to be separable
may seem at first blush to be a violation of substantive due process. But
relief on this basis is problematic. 7 In any event, Monaghan's argument
is not predicated on arbitrariness, which he does not so much as mention-indeed, which would limit the operation of his thesis to the very

86. Monaghan's position is the more perplexing because he understands that, in the case of
a state statute, the question of separability is "controlled by state law." Monaghan, supra note 10,
at 34. That being so, if a state statute is constitutional insofar as applied to the claimant, and if the
state courts have rejected an argument of nonseparability, in what sense has the claimant been
convicted under an invalid (or unconstitutional) statute, even for state purposes let alone federal
purposes? State courts do not proclaim that they are dispensing punishments on the basis of
concededly invalid statutes. They invoke the sanction of state law for what they do, and the law of
a state is what the courts of the state declare it to be. If a state court rejects a claim of
nonseparability, it states that it is doing so as a matter of construction of the pertinent statute or on
some other state law ground, such as failure to raise the issue in a timely manner. See TRIBE, supra
note 20, § 3-24, at 162-64. When a federal statute is involved, rejection of a claim of nonseparability
is likewise dispositive.
87. If state judicial arbitrariness in the construction of a state statute were a violation of
substantive due process, then so too would be all state decisions involving the common law. Every
conceivable state court ruling on a question of state law would be reviewable by the Supreme Court
on a claim of error so gross as to verge into arbitrariness. Claims of procedural unfairness are
another matter, they raise the issue of procedural due process and are of course reviewable. But if
there were a rule that all nonprocedural determinations by state courts on state law matters are
reviewable for arbitrariness, and if the Supreme Court took such a rule seriously, the result would
be to crowd out a major part of the Court's other business. The Author is unaware of any Supreme
Court decision supporting such use of the Due Process Clause.
Further, if there were such a doctrine, it would receive little application as a practical matter.
For if it were at all possible to attribute the action of the state court to stupefying incompetence, as
distinct from, say, knavery, there can be little doubt that the Supreme Court would incline towards
the former rationalization and declare the issue to be one of state law.
But an exception must be noted, arising when the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
invoked for review of state court judgments. For example, if a claim is made that a state statute violates the Contract Clause, a state court ruling that a contract never came into existence to begin with
would normally be considered an independent state ground precluding Supreme Court review of the
question arising under the Contract Clause. But if the state court is allowed the last word on this
preliminary issue, the effect would be a Contract Clause having no more force than the state courts
are willing to allow it. Hence, the rule has developed that, to preclude Supreme Court review of the
constitutional question, the state ground must be "adequate," which this Author understands to mean
that the state court's decision of the preliminary issue of state law must not be arbitrary or otherwise
clearly inconsistent with the state law materials available to it at the time of its decision. See Alfred
Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 943 (1965).
A wholly different problem would be presented if a state court arbitrarily refused to entertain
a claim of nonseparability. Assuming such a claim may appropriately be asserted under the law of
the state, this could constitute procedural unfairness in violation of the Due Process Clause.
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few cases in which error of this magnitude could be demonstrated.
Also puzzling is Monaghan's argument for rejecting the substantiality requirement (under which an overbreadth challenge fails for want of
significant chilling). He contends, in effect, that rejection of an overbreadth attack on this basis is tantamount to denial of an opportunity to
show that the statute applied to the claimant is unconstitutional in that its
valid provisions are not separable from its invalid provisions.8 But a
claimant has always been entitled to advance a defense based on
nonseparability; indeed, such cases have been quite common.89 The
claimant has always been free to invoke review by the Supreme Court if
such a defense has been rejected, although, in the case of a state statute,
success would turn upon convincing the Court that the nonseparability
point as such presents a federal question. So far as the Author is aware,
the FAO cases that have been considered by the Court have never
involved a claim of nonseparabiltiy, and Monaghan does not contend
otherwise. This kind of claim is not being rejected when the claimant
seeks relief solely on the ground of overbreadth inimical to third persons
and relief is denied for lack of substantiality.
Finally, even if Monaghan's thesis was valid, there would be little
scope for its operation. After all, the terms of criminal statutes are
typically construed as separable; a holding of nonseparability is the
relatively rare exception." If a state statute is involved and a state court
holds the part pertaining to the claimant to be separable while upholding
the rest of the statute, or pretermitting that issue, under Monaghan's view
the remainder of the statute, even if the Supreme Court would have
found it overbroad, remains on the books no matter how severe the chill
that is cast upon protected speech.9" There would be a similar outcome
when what is involved is a federal statute.9' Thus, Monaghan errs in his
belief that he is offering a superior rationalization for the results reached
by the Supreme Court under the FAO Doctrine. His thesis is essentially

88. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 33-35.
89. Typically, a case in which a court talks about separability vel non is one in which the
statute has been invalidated in its application to others, or that issue has been pretermitted. See the
listings under Statutes section 64(6) in the successive Decennial Digests published by the West
Publishing Company.
90. See Dorf, supra note 77, at 295-304 (state practice); id. at 288-93 (federal practice).

91. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 36-39.
92. In cases involving state statutes, a holding of separability by a state court would ordinarily
constitute an independent state ground, precluding Supreme Court review of the constitutional issue.

See Hill, supra note 87, at 948. In the case of a federal statute, a sustainable holding of separability
by a federal court would preclude any ruling on the constitutional issue as unnecessary and therefore

to be avoided. See supra note 18.
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a prescription for elimination of the FAO Doctrine.93 A basic problem
with Monaghan's thesis is that it sees the FAO Doctrine as one
concerned exclusively with the rights of the claimant. The peril of such
an approach is illustrated by the case now to be discussed.
B. Board of Trustees v. Fox

In Board of Trustees v. Fox, the Court held that, in an FAO case,
a first-person claim may be joined with a third-person claim.94 Then,
without reference to Monaghan or other sources, the Court went on to
say:
It is not the usual judicial practice... nor do we consider it generally
desirable, to proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily--that is,
before it is determined that the statute would be valid as applied. Such
a course would convert use of the overbreadth doctrine from a
necessary means of vindicatingthe plaintiff's own right not to be bound
by a statute that is unconstitutionalinto a means of mounting gratuitous
wholesale attacks upon state and federal laws. Moreover, the overbreadth question is ordinarily more difficult to resolve than the asapplied .... Thus, for reasons relating both to the proper functioning

93. Professor Fallon agrees with Monaghan on some essentials. He believes that Monaghan's
thesis embraces what be, Fallon, calls the FAO Doctrine's "rule-of-law core": to wit, "a statute that
proscribes any constitutionally protected conduct is unconstitutional in its totality unless severable."
Fallon, supra note 38, at 874-75, 889. But he also makes the point that this "rule-of-law core" is a
"narrow" one, id. at 889, concluding that most of the FAO decisions have been intended by the
Court as prophylaxis, see Id. at 875, 889. In this connection, he recognizes that if Monaghan's
position constituted the governing rule, a statute would survive a holding of separability despite the
chilling effect of its unconstitutional elements. See id. at 889.
It is difficult to understand Fallon's "rule-of-law" argument except as one pertaining to
punishment despite nonseparability. But as has been argued above, error in rejecting a claim of
nonseparability does not constitute impairment of a constitutional right. See supratext accompanying
notes 85-86. It would be another matter if the court proclaims that the terms of the statute are not
separable but sends the claimant to jail anyway; that would indeed be contrary to the rule of law,
but such cases do not arise.
So far as concerns Monaghan's argument, Professor Dorf agrees essentially with Professor
Fallon. See Dorf, supra note 77, at 261-64.
Professor Tribe's endorsement of Monaghan's position is summary in character and
apparently unqualified. He provides an additional argument: "When the Supreme Court declares a
statute void on its face for overbreadth, such a holding implies .. . that a saving construction is
unavailable ... ." TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-32, at 1036-37. This may be true in the case of a
federal statute, assuming that the issue of a saving construction has been duly raised. It is patently
untrue in litigation over a state statute, where the Supreme Court has no basis for predicting whether
or not a state court would render an adequate saving construction. See Note, supra note 12, at 89494. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484 (1989).
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of courts and to their efficiency, the lawfulness of the particular
application of the law should ordinarily be decided first.95
While the foregoing statement purported to be in accord with
existing law, nothing like it had ever before appeared in an opinion of
the Court. What the statement comes down to is that, insofar as operation
of the FAO Doctrine tends to eliminate the chilling effect of overbreadth
on third persons, this is incidental and dubious as an end in itself; for to
countenance it as an end in itself would encourage "gratuitous wholesale
attacks upon state and federal laws."96 But what the Court chose to call
"gratuitous wholesale attacks" are precisely what the FAO Doctrine, as
consistently defined and applied in the past, is designed to promote in
order to prevent the chilling of the protected speech of third persons.97
Also puzzling is the Court's stated reluctance to "proceed to an
overbreadth issue unnecessarily."" If economy of judicial effort is a
controlling consideration in this context, the Court would have done well
to strangle the FAO Doctrine at its birth. After all, under the as-applied
mode previously applicable, if the claimant failed in a first-person attack
on the statute, a court was bound to go no further.
The Court's statement that the "overbreadth doctrine [is] a necessary
means of vindicating the plaintiff's own right not to be bound by a
statute that is unconstitutional" accords with Monaghan's own view of
the matter." The implication of the quoted language is that such means
did not exist prior to development of the FAO Doctrine, which is
demonstrably and unsurprisingly false;..0 or else that the FAO Doctrine
is no more than declaratory of the law as it stood before, which would
signify that, as Monaghan contends, the Court has erred in denying FAO
relief in cases where there was no substantial chilling and in cases of

95. Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added). Earlier, in New York v. Ferber,458 U.S. 747 (1982), the
Court, in the course of observing that one whose conduct is unprotected may prevail by showing that

the pertinent statute is "invalid on its face," stated also that "[o]verbreadth challenges are only one
type of facial attack," with a "see generally" citation of Monaghan's Overbreadth.Id. at 768 n.21.
However, the rest of the opinion is the antithesis of Monaghan's viewpoint, for it speaks of the FAO
Doctrine as essentially a standing rule designed to curtail the chilling effect of overbroad statutes;
the holding in the case was that the FAO Doctrine should not apply because the chilling effect of

the statute involved was insubstantial. See id at 769-74.
96. Fox, 492 U.S. at 485.
97. It is not as if the court could proceed without a showing of justiciability-which requires
that by reason of the statute the claimant suffers punishment or has reason to fear imminent
punishment. See TRiBE, supra note 20, at 68-69.

98. Fox, 492 U.S. at 484-85.
99. Id. at 485; see also supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
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commercial speech;'.' or else the Court simply forgot its innumerable
decisions in the as-applied mode, under which unprivileged conduct

remains punishable whether or not the pertinent statute is unconstitutional
with regard to third persons.

Under Fox, if claimants succeed without the benefit of the FAO
Doctrine because their own constitutional rights have been impaired, the
overbroad statute is left standing. 2 The Court sees this as a virtue
because judicial economy has been served. Whether a court should
pursue overbreadth analysis and decree accordingly is perhaps not an
easy question when claimants have successfully asserted rights personal

to themselves.' But it is a question worth exploring. Fox, in effect,
proclaims that there is nothing to explore since the FAO Doctrine exists
only to serve the interests of claimants.' It may be added that the
Court cited no cases in support of the assertion that its "usual practice"
has been to decide overbreadth claims only after first-person claims have
been rejected, and the Author has found none."'

101. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 23, 33-36.
102. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 485-86.
103. In at least partial support of Fox it can be argued that the Court has always envisioned the
FAO Doctrine as one initiated by an unprotected claimant. But it does not follow that FAO relief
must be denied if the claimant can prevail in his or her own right. Prior to Fox, the problem had
never before been considered by the Court.
As a general rule, when a controversy can be disposed of on two independent grounds, a
court has discretion to adopt either or both. A basic exception to the rule derives from the policy,
earlier mentioned, of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions-but this is obviously
inapplicable in an FAO context. There is no anomaly in granting relief on both claims or on the
third-person claim alone.
A problem arises if success in the two claims does not yield an identical result-if success
in the third-person claim yields the claimant, at most, freedom from punishment until the overbreadth
has been eliminated (if that can be done). For if success in the first-person claim produces
exoneration, the question arises whether there is any point in proceeding to the third-person claim
with its lesser remedy. But this question is pertinent only if the claimant is the sole intended
beneficiary of the FAO Doctrine. It lacks pertinence if the FAO Doctrine is intended, even in part,
to protect third persons. If the latter, there is no superfluity in framing the decree accordingly.
A complication that will not be pursued here is what happens if one who might have asserted
a third-person claim asserts only a first-person claim-which is unlikely to happen in any event. See
supra note 39.
104. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 485.
105. The dissenting opinion in Fox stated that "at times we have suggested that as-applied
challenges should be decided before overbreadth challenges." Id. at 487 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing only Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985)). But Brockett is inapposite.
There, a federal court had invalidated an overbroad state statute upon concluding that it could not
be saved, and the Supreme Court reversed. See Brockett, 472 U.S. at 507. After observing that the
challenged statute was unconstitutional in its application to the claimants, the Court stated that FAO
relief is inappropriate
where the parties challenging the statute are those who desire to engage in protected
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CONCLUSION

The FAO Doctrine significantly fails to eliminate the chilling effect
of overbreadth statutes prior to the time overbreadth has been eliminated.
This is remediable. As matters stand, the FAQ Doctrine operates
prospectively only. On the other hand, the FAO Doctrine does not work
in a burdensome manner, the Court's assumption to the contrary
notwithstanding.
The Court's confusion about the remedial consequences following

upon a holding of overbreadth stems from its failure to perceive some
fundamental differences between FAO adjudication and as-applied
adjudication. These differences are largely illuminated, and the confusion
is largely dispelled by focus on the FAO role of the inferior courts,
federal and state.
Monaghan's thesis would eviscerate the FAQ Doctrine altogether.
Intimations of that thesis in Board of Trustees v. Fox do not bode well,

but it is plain that the Court was unaware that its dictum made a sharp
break with the FAQ Doctrine as previously understood.

speech that the overbroad statute purports to punish, or who seek to publish both
protected and unprotected material. There is then no want of a proper party to challenge
the statute, no concern that an attack on the statute will be unduly delayed or protected
speech discouraged. The statute may forthwith be declared invalid to the extent that it
reaches too far, but otherwise left intact.
Id. at 504.
In effect, the Court said that FAO relief is unnecessary and superfluous when there is overlap
between first-person claims and any claims that might have been made with regard to third-person
overbreadth--as was the situation in Brockett, where the only infirmity the Court saw in the statute
was its use of the term "lust" in the definition of obscenity. See id. at 501.
Thus, the Brockett rationale was quite different from that of Fox. The implication of Fox is
that whether or not there is overlap is immaterial; for reasons ofjudicial economy, the courts should
do no more than is needed to protect the claimant. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 485. Brockett, however,
recognizes the need to protect "others not before the court." Brockett, 472 U.S. at 503.
The Fox dissenters also cited two cases that did not follow what the majority had called the
"usual practice." Fox, 492 U.S. at 487 n.2.
Two years after Fox, the case was cited, with full quotation of the passage in the text
accompanying note 95, supra, in Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 324 (1991), where the Court only
spoke of a possible advantage in taking up a first-person claim before proceeding to an FAO claim.
Thus, the Court had no occasion to consider the implications of the Fox rationale.
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